OPTIMISM Training Platform

The incident occurred in the engine room of a bulk carrier during a routine voyage. The vessel had experienced recurring problems with the main engine’s fuel injector pumps. On this day, the Chief Engineer (C/E) instructed two engine crew members—Motorman A and Motorman B—to carry out maintenance while the engine was running at low load. It was a task they had performed before, but the approach taken on this occasion would prove catastrophic.

The maintenance involved replacing a fuel injector pump on the port side of the engine. Standard safety protocols required that the fuel supply be isolated, pressure released, and the area adequately ventilated before work commenced. However, pressed for time and aiming to avoid delays to the ship’s schedule, the crew bypassed these steps.

As the motormen loosened the securing nuts, fuel under high pressure sprayed into the surrounding hot engine components. Within seconds, atomised fuel vapour ignited on contact with the engine’s heated surfaces, triggering a violent explosion. Flames erupted instantly, filling the confined engine room space with thick black smoke and intense heat.

Motorman B, positioned closest to the blast, sustained severe burns to his face and hands. Motorman A was thrown backwards by the force of the explosion, suffering injuries to his legs and back. The C/E, who was in the control room at the time, immediately initiated the engine room fire response plan. Fire suppression systems were activated, and the crew managed to bring the fire under control within minutes. However, both injured crew members required urgent evacuation to shore for medical treatment.

The investigation identified multiple safety violations and lapses in judgement. The most critical was the decision to perform high-risk maintenance on a running engine without isolating the fuel system. The lack of adherence to lock-out/tag-out (LOTO) procedures created a dangerous environment in which pressurised fuel lines were exposed to ignition sources.

Compounding this were deficiencies in risk assessment. No formal assessment had been documented, and no toolbox talk was held to identify hazards and agree on a safe method of work. It was evident that a culture of expediency had taken root—where operational continuity was valued above strict compliance with safety protocols.

This explosion was entirely avoidable. Following standard procedures—isolating the fuel supply, depressurising the system, wearing fire-resistant PPE, and ensuring adequate ventilation—would have removed the ignition risk entirely. Training on the dangers of hot work and fuel system maintenance in operational conditions should be reinforced for all engineering staff, regardless of experience level.